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FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT-A LIBERALIZED
INTERPRETATION
In an action against the United States under the Federal
Tort Claims Act, claimant sought recovery for cargo damage
which resulted from the grounding of the tug and barge carrying
the cargo. Clain1ant alleged that the grounding was caused by"
the failure of Coast Guard personnel to check and repair a navigational light, or to notify claimant that the light was not operating. A motion to dismiss on the theory that a private person
would not be liable under "like circumstances," as required by
the act, was granted by the district court. The court of appeals
affirmed.1 Certiorari was granted2 and the judgment affirmed
by an equally divided court.3 On rehearing, held: reversed, on
the ground that a private person would be liable under "like
circumstances." For example, one undertaking to warn the public
of danger and thereby inducing reliance would be liable for a
failure to perform his good samaritan task in a careful manner:i,
The instant case is important not only because it clarifies a
previously hazy area but also because the logic of the case could
be used to greatly liberalize recovery against the Government.
In 1946 the federal government generally waived its immunity
to tort liability by the passage of the Federal Tort Claims Act. 0
Immunity was reserved, however, in specific areas. 6 In addiIndian Towing Co. v. United States, 211 F.2d 886 (5th Cir. 1954).
Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 348 U.S. 810 (1954).
3 Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 349 U.S. 902 (1955) (per curiam
decision).
4Indian Towing Co. v. United States. 350 U.S. 61, 64-65 (1955).
u 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-80 (Supp. 1952).
6 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (Supp. 1952) exempts from its operation twelve
classes of tort claims including (1) claims based upon acts or omissions
of employees and agencies in the execution of a statute or regulation or
based upon discretionazy functions or duties; (2) claims arising out of
loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of postal matter; ( 3) claims
arising in respect of the assessment or collection of ta..'i:es or custom
duties, or the detention of goods or merchandise by customs or law-enforcement officers; ( 4) claims for damages caused by the imposition of a
quarantine by the United States; (5) claims arising from injuries to vessels
or persons while passing through the Panama Canal locks or zone waters;
( 6) claims arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest,
malicious prosecution, abuse of process. libel, slander, misrepresentation,
deceit, or interference with contract rights; (7) claims for damages
caused by the fiscal operations of the Treasuzy; (8) claims arising out
of combatant activities of militazy or naval forces, or the Coast Guard,
during time of war; (9) claims arising in foreign countries; (10) claims
arising from activities of TVA; (11) claims arising from activities of the
Panama Railroad Co.; and (12) claims relating to claims or suits in admiralty against the United States.
1

2
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tion, the act states that "the United States shall be liable . . in
the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual
under like circumstances ...." 7 (Emphasis added) in accordance
with the law of the state where the alleged negligence occurs.
The Government has contended that this phrase should be interpreted to exclude many claims not falling within the specific
exceptions of the act. At first, the dichotomy urged by the Government was that of governmental functions as contrasted to
proprietary functions, with liability only as to the latter.8 But
this view was rejected in a series of cases.9 The Government
has also argued that risky activities which are authorized by
Congress should be immune. 10 This was also rejected. Finally,
the Government narrowed its argument by asserting that only
imiquely governmental activities were exempt from liability.11
Such an activity is one, by Government definition, which has no
exact private counterpart. Thus, military activities, prison activities, taxing activities, and explosions of nuclear devices would
be termed uniquely governmental. In contrast, claimants have
argued for a liberal construction; i.e., the use of an analogy to
similar private activities.
The narrow construction urged by the Government was sustained in four cases. In Feres v. United States,12 liability was
denied when soldiers were injured by negligent medical treatment, and by negligent maintenance of quarters. The Supreme
Court rejected the analogy to the doctor-patient and landlord-tenant relationships, and reasoned that the relationship of soldier to
government is unique since no private individual can conscript an
army. In Sigmon v. United States, 13 liability was denied when a
prison inmate was injured in a prison machine shop. Rejecting
the employer-employee relationship, a district court found the
activity to be uniquely governmental since no private person
could incarcerate another. Thus, in these two cases, by ignoring
28 U.S.C. § 2674 (Supp. 1952).
s This argument was based upon implications from certain sections of
the act. See 28 u.s.c. §§ 2674, 2680 (Supp. 1952).
9 Air Transport Associates v. United States, 221 F.2d 467, 470 (9th
Cir. 1955); Mid-Central Fish Co. v. United States, 210 F.2d 263 (8th Cir.
1954), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 967 (1954); Somerset Seafood Co. v. United
States, 193 F.2d 631 (4th cir. 1951); Claypool v. United States, 98 F. Supp.
7·02 (S.D. Cal. 1951); Cerri v. United States, 80 F. Supp. 831 (N.D. Cal.
1948).
10 Bullock v. United States, 133 F. Supp. 885, 891 (D. Utah 1951).
11 Supra note 4.
12 340 U.S. 134 (1950).
13110 F. Supp. 9·06 (W.D. Va. 1953).
7
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the activity at the operational level, and looking only at the overall character of the activity, the courts have found that the activity was uniquely governmental. This uniquely governmental
technique has also been applied to the operational level. In Dalehite
v. United States,14 a shipboard fire, caused by government negligence, was negligently allowed to spread by geverrunent firefighters. The negligent acts which caused the fire were held
to come under the "discretionary act" exception of the act; thus,
the question of whether the over-all aspect of the activity was
uniquely governmental was not raised. But the Supreme Court
found fire-fighting, the operational level activity, to be a uniquely
governmental activity, thus barring recovery. In another case,
a. lower federal court used the same technique to deny liability
for loss of personal property caused by government negligence
in failing to properly supervise migratory workers.lt;
Thus, the uniquely governmental technique has been used
to preclude liability under the act at the over-all or operational
level of an activity.
In the instant case the Government relied on the claim that
the activity at its operational level had no exact counterpart in
private activity.rn But the Court interpreted the phrase "like
circumstances" to mean that recovery will be allowed if a private
person has carried or could car1'y on an analogous activity at the
operational level. Thus, since a private person could conceivably
operate a lighthouse and since private persons do operate analogous activities, e.g., railroad crossing lights; recovery would be
allowed.
This reasoning would seem to destroy the validity of the
Feres, Sigmon, and Dalehite decisions since analogous private activities can be found for the so-called uniquely governmental
activities of these cases. The doctor-patient and landlord-tenant
situations are analogous to the Feres situations at the operational
level.17 In the Sigmon case, the employee-employer relationship
346 U.S. 15 (1953).
Goodwill Industries v. United States, 218 F.2d 270 (5th Cir. 1954).
Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 64 (1955).
17 Even if the Court had found that there was an analogous activity at
the operational level, the· claimant would still have been blocked from
recovery since the Court held that the Army's comprehensive compensation plan made the activity uniquely governmental at the over-all level.
This reasoning was extended to the prison industries in the Sigmon dec1s10n. It should be noted, however, that there are comparable compensation plans in private industry in view of state workman's compensation laws and the health and accident insurance now carried by most
14

15
16
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provides the analogy at the operational level. The analogy on
the over-all plane is more difficult to find. But an analogy can
be had to private sanitariums which maintain similar activities,
i.e., security and rehabilitation. As to the Dalehite case, the firefighting departments of major corporations which do not wish
to rely on municipal facilities provide an analogy in private activity to the federal fire-fighting crews.
At least one federal court. has put this type of reasoning
to use in holding the Government liable. A cause of action has
been deemed to exist where damage was allegedly caused by
negligence connected with the explosion of a nuclear device since
it can be analogized to private blasting activities.18
It appears obvious, therefore, that for even the most uniquely
governmental activity, a "like circumstance" can be found in private activity. For instance, taxing can be likened to the collection of private dues by a fraternal organization, the postal system can be likened to the privately operated railway express
system, and the spread of pestilence can be compared to the
spread of noxious weeds. But the question is whether the Court
will carry this reasoning to its limits or whether it will seize
upon distinguishing factors to act as a brake on the use of the
analogy. The instant case, for example, involves the elements of
volunteering and reliance. Lower federal courts have relied
heavily on these elements in holding the Government liable,19 and
thus these elements may provide the Court with a convenient reason for refusing to apply its principles to other cases not involving reliance. In this connection, it should be noted that the
large corporations. But even if this hurdle is surmounted by the claimant, he is still faced with the fact that no private activity can conscript or
incarcerate individuals. Thus. if the Court wishes to segregate these
areas from liability, it has a sound basis on which to rest its uniquely
governmental dichotomy.

1s Bulloch v. United States, 133 F. Supp. 885 (1955).
19 Eastern Air Lines v. Union Trust Company, 221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir.
1955), aff'd per curiam, United States v. Union Trust Co., 350 U.S. 907
(1955) (a control tower gave out information which resulted in plane
crashes); United States v. Lawter, 219 F.2d 559 (5th Cir. 1955) (the
Coast Guard negligently conducted a helicopter rescue which resulted in
the death of a person being rescued); Bevilacqua v. United States, 122 F.
Supp. 493 (W.D. Penn. 1954) (the Government failed to maintain a
navigational light on a dam which resulted in a boat sailing over a dam).
Where the quality of reliance is weak, as in relying on weather forecasts, liability has been denied. Mid-Central Fish Co. v. United States, 210
F.2d. 263 (8th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 967 (1954).
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Court, in the instant case, specifically refused to over-rule the
Feres and Dalehite decisions, perhaps because these cases didn't
involve the essential element of reliance. Anyway, the path is
clear for the Court's distinguishing the present case from future
fact situations which have more elements in common with Feres,
Sigmon, and Dalehite. In this connection, it should be noted that
there is not an analogy which can be drawn to a government
activity which would be more strained and far-fetched than the
one drawn in the instant case, i.e., that a private person could
operate a lighthouse. The restrictions placed on lighthouse operations by the Government make the operation of a lighthouse by
a private individual practically impossible.20 If the Court is not
reluctant to draw such an analogy in this area, there is little to
indicate that the use of the analogy won't result in quite a liberal
interpretation being placed on the act.
The basic question becomes, therefore, whether the Court's
reasoning in the instant case should be extended to its limits. This
involves a consideration of the act's safeguards against excessive
liability, the policy considerations inherent in the act, and other
policy factors.
The act is sweeping in its waiver of immunity, and it seems
inconsistent to whittle the scope of this immunity by refinements
not spelled out in the act, especially since the act's exceptions
are so clearly stated.21 In addition, even if recovery is denied
under the act because of narrow construction, Congress may be
forced to enact relief legislation or the claimant may bring a
private bill to remedy the inequity.22 Thus, a narrow construction will defeat one of the primary reasons for the passage of
the act, namely, the elimination of congressional consideration of
tort claims.23 A narrow construction has been rejected by some
lower courts: viz, (1) the rejection of the governmental-proprietary dichotomy, 24 (2) the inclusion of maritime torts as well as
common-law torts,25 (3) inclusion of negligent acts following the
use of discretion, 26 (4) the limitation of the assault and battery
20 33 C.F.R. § 66 (1949).
21 Supra note 6.
22 See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 378, 69 Stat. 707 (1955) (Texas City disaster
relief); Priv. L. No. 194, 65 Stat. A74 (1951) (claim arising in foreign
country); Priv. L. No. 135, 65 Stat. A52 (1951) (government employee
acting outside scope of authority).
23Somerset Seafood Co. v. United States, 193 F.2d 631 (4th Cir. 1951);
Cerri v. United States, 80 F. Supp. 831 (N.D. Cal. 1948).
24 Supra note 8.
25Somerset Seafood Co. v. United States. 19::! F.2d 631 (4th Cir. 1951).
26 Supra note 4.
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exception of the act to government employees' assaults as contrasted to assaults of prisoners who were given the opportunity
to assault by the negligence of a government employee.27
It is argued that an extension of the reasoning of the instant case is likely to expose the government to novel causes of
action or excessive claims.28 First, it should be noted that just
because a cause of action is novel does not mean that it is "spurious." If novel claims were never allowed, the law would forever
stand still. Often an analogy can be used to break through
fictitous and antiquated restrictions in tort law which hamper
the administration of justice. For instance, the federal courts
have found duties (1) to give adequate warning of dangerous
conditions to navigators,29 and (2) to limit the use of water as a
riparian owner to a reasonable use,30 even though the state law
didn't directly support such principles. Also, a court has allowed
the use of negligence as a theory of recovery where state law made
the defendant liable without fault. 31 These cases follow the
apparent desire of the courts to give a liberal construction to
the act in an effort to effectuate its purpose.
The act provides additional safeguards against spurious, novel
or excessive claims through the elimination of juries,32 elimination of punitive damages, 33 and through the specific exceptions of
the act. In addition, the normal rules of tort law, such as the
risk theory, will often restrict liability.
With the growth of western civilization and its emphasis on
government as existing for the individual, as well as vice-versa,
the idea that "The King can do no wrong" has fallen into disrepute; one result being the Federal Tort Claims Act. There
seems to be a reluctance on the part of the courts, however, to
allow extensive claims. This has been suggested as one of the
reasons for the Dalehite decision,34 which involved approximately
Panella v. United States, 216 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1954).
2s Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 43 (1953); Nat. Mfg. Co. v.
United States, 210 F.2d 263, 275 (8th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 347 U.S.
967 (1954).
29 Dye v. United States, 210 F.2d 123 (6th Cir. 1954).
30United States v. Praylou, 208 F.2d 291 (4th Cir. 1953), cert. denied,
347 U.S. 934 (1954).
31 Smith v. United States. 113 F. Supp. 131 (D. Del. 1953).
32 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (Supp. 1952).
33 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (Supp. 1952).
34 See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 60 (1953)
(dissenting
opinion); 32 Tex. L. Rev. 474 (1954); 23 Tenn. L. Rev. 243 (1954); 5
Syracuse L. Rev. 101 (1953).
21
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two hundred million dollars. While such a loss would add but a
minute amount to the tax dollar of the multitude of taxpayers,
it may be ruinous to the individuals sustaining the loss. It is
difficult to see why a person should support a larger proportion
of the expenses of maintaining the Government than is provided
for in the taxation system. Congress has seen fit to appropriate
huge amounts for natural disasters such as floods and droughts,
and for military and economic disasters in foreign countries.
Surely the disasters caused by the Government's own negligence
can be compensated for out of tax funds. If Congress feels that
liability for certain activities involves too great a possible drain
upon the Treasury, it can, as it has done with flood control damage, amend the act to make a specific exception.3 ::; It seems far
better for Congress to make exceptions in light of its knowledge
of expected budget commitments, than for the courts to do so.
It is submitted that there are adequate protections within
the act against spurious or excessive claims, and that the logic
of the instant case can be used to establish guideposts which can
result in a liberalization in tort law; that the policy of restricting private bills calls for a liberal construction as does the policy
of equality of economic burden among taxpayers in maintaining
any given governmental activity; and that the legislative body,
with its vast fact finding powers and knowledge of expected
demands upon the Treasury, is better equipped to add restrictions
upon the act than is the judiciary. The instant case provides
the vehicle of logic by which such a liberal interpretation can be
attained.
Charles K. Thompson, '56
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33 U.S.C. § 702(c) (Supp. 1952).

